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Riggins v. Nevada: Toward a Standard for Medicating the
Incompetent Defendant to Competence
Freedom to think is absolute of its own nature; the most tyranni-
cal government is powerless to control the inward workings of the
mind. I
"Well all you want to do is medicate me and you've been medi-
cating me.... [Y]ou are burning me out of my life... [Y]ou are
burning me out of my freedom. "2
Riggins v. Nevada,3 a case involving a schizophrenic man who heard
voices and killed his drug supplier because he believed the supplier was
putting AIDS-infected blood on his cocaine, recently presented the
United States Supreme Court with an intriguing question: Can the State
force a defendant to take antipsychotic medications to make him compe-
tent to stand trial, even if those medications have side effects that will
prejudice his defense? After considering the issue, the Court declined to
answer, deciding that it need not reach that question. The Court did
hold, however, that the State can compel an incompetent defendant to
take antipsychotic drugs before trial in certain circumstances. Essen-
tially, the State's interest in bringing alleged wrongdoers to trial must be
balanced against the defendant's interest in personal autonomy and his
right to a fair trial. The Court also shed some light on the factors that
should be considered when balancing these two competing interests.
This Note assesses the Court's reasoning and the apparent limits it
imposes on medicating incompetent defendants before trial and examines
the direction the Court may be headed when it considers this question
more fully.4 The Note also analyzes the medical and legal considerations
underlying decisions to medicate defendants.' The Note suggests that
although the State's interest may be compelling, otherwise incompetent
defendants are particularly likely to receive an unfair trial because of the
forced administration of medication. Therefore, these defendants should
be given substantial protections, such as imposing on the State the bur-
den to disprove prejudice to the defendant by clear and convincing evi-
l. Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 618 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting), vacated, 319 U.S.
103 (1943).
2. Defendant Harper, quoted in Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 239 n.4 (1990)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
3. 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992).
4. See infra notes 81-99 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 46-56 and accompanying text.
1993] MEDICATING THE INCOMPETENT 1207
dence before medication will be administered.6
Paul Wade was found dead in his Las Vegas apartment by his girl-
friend at around 3:00 a.m. on November 20, 1987. 7 He had been stabbed
thirty-two times in the head, chest, and back.' Two days later, police
arrested David Riggins and charged him with the murder. 9 After being
jailed for a few days, Riggins complained that he was having trouble
sleeping and that he had been hearing voices.10 A doctor prescribed Mel-
laril for Riggins, a common antipsychotic drug that Riggins said had
been used successfully in the past to treat his condition.11
In preparation for trial, Riggins's counsel moved for a determina-
tion of his client's competency. Psychiatrists examined Riggins in Febru-
ary and March of 1988.12 After reading their reports, the trial court
found Riggins competent to stand trial. 3 Riggins then filed notice that
he would plead insanity and moved to have the Mellaril discontinued,
arguing that the drug deprived him of his right to present his defense. 4
The State opposed the motion, contending that Riggins needed medica-
tion in order to be competent for trial. 5 A hearing on the motion was
held at which three psychiatrists testified, none of whom stated that tak-
ing Riggins off the medication would make him incompetent to stand
trial.16 In fact, two of the three psychiatrists speculated that Riggins
6. See infra notes 107-38 and accompanying text.
7. Brief for Respondent at 2, Riggins (No. 90-8466).
8. Id.
9. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1812. Riggins's roommate, who gave him a ride to Wade's
apartment, linked him to the murder scene. The roommate testified that he waited for Riggins
outside the apartment for about 30 minutes before Riggins returned. An hour later, Wade's
girlfriend arrived home and discovered Wade's body. Brief for Respondent at 2, Riggins (No.
90-8466).
10. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Riggins (No. 90-8466).
11. Id. at 4. Mellaril is the trade name for thioridazine, an antipsychotic drug often used
in the treatment of acute and chronic schizophrenia. Id. at 4 n.2.
12. When examined, Riggins was taking 450 milligrams of Mellaril per day. His dosage
was initially 100 milligrams per day, and was gradually increased to the maximum recom-
mended dose of 800 milligrams per day by the time of his trial. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1812.
13. In most jurisdictions, a defendant is competent to stand trial if he has the capacity to
understand the nature of the proceedings and the capacity to assist in his own defense. See
Steve Tomashefsky, Note, Antipsychotic Drugs and Fitness to Stand Trial. The Right of the
Unfit Accused to Refuse Treatment, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 773, 780 (1985).
14. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Riggins (No. 90-8466).
15. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1812-13.
16. Brief for Petitioner at 5, Riggins (No. 90-8466). One of the psychiatrists, Dr. Master,
concluded that terminating the medication probably would not have a noticeable effect on
Riggins's behavior. Brief for Respondent at 6, Riggins (No. 90-8466). Dr. Quass, who pre-
scribed the Mellaril when Riggins was arrested, believed that Riggins would remain competent
even if the medication were terminated, although he thought it more prudent to continue the
medication because Riggins continued to complain of hearing voices. Id. at 8. A third psychi-
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might be faking his symptoms.17 Despite the consensus that taking Rig-
gins off medication would not make him incompetent, the trial court de-
nied Riggins's motion in a one-page order that included no findings of
fact.18 As a result, the State continued to administer 800 milligrams of
Mellaril per day to Riggins throughout his trial.19 At trial, Riggins testi-
fied in his own behalf in an effort to support his insanity defense.20 He
was convicted and sentenced to death.
On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed Riggins's convic-
tion.21 The court decided that expert testimony describing the effect of
the Mellaril on Riggins's demeanor and testimony was enough to over-
come any possible prejudice.22 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari.23
Riggins argued to the Supreme Court that being forced to take the
medication violated his due process rights. In an opinion written by Jus-
tice O'Connor, the Court overturned the conviction because the trial
atrist, Dr. O'Gorman, had been Riggins's psychiatrist for several years. He was unsure
whether Riggins would remain competent if the medication were stopped. Id. at 10. Although
he was not taking the drug at the time of the murder, Riggins had been taking Mellaril for
much of the past six years. Id. at 9.
17. Dr. Master said Riggins was manipulative and had the ability to fake psychosis in
court. Brief for Respondent at 6, Riggins (No. 90-8466). Dr. O'Gorman believed Riggins
made up the claim that he heard the voices of Satan and Satan's assistant to influence Dr.
Jurasky, the only one of the four psychiatrists who did not attend Riggins's competency hear-
ing. Id. at 9. Dr. Jurasky, who was away during the hearing, submitted a report to the court
stating his opinion that Riggins would be incompetent for trial even with medication. Brief for
Petitioner at 6 n.3, Riggins (No. 90-8466).
18. Brief for Petitioner at 6, Riggins (No. 90-8466). The Supreme Court described the
trial judge's order as "laconic." Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1816.
19. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1813. The daily dosage was the maximum recommended for the
medication. While no question of the propriety of the dosage was raised, one of the psychia-
trists stated that "[i]f you are dealing with someone very sick then you may prescribe up to 800
milligrams which is the dose he had been taking which is very, very high. I mean you can
tranquilize an elephant with 800 milligrams." Id. at 1819 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting
Dr. Jurasky).
20. Riggins's bizarre testimony included the assertions that he was the son of John F.
Kennedy and Marilyn Monroe, and that the Mafia was after him. Brief for Petitioner at 7,
Riggins (No. 90-8466). He said he had heard the voices of "Satan and his assistant," who told
him how to hurt or kill people and that he was hospitalized after wandering the streets in his
underwear. Id. He said he killed Wade because Wade had tried to kill him by putting fiber-
glass in his water and squirting AIDS-infected blood on his cocaine. Id.
21. Riggins v. State, 107 Nev. 178, 184, 808 P.2d 535, 538 (1991), rev'd sub nom., Riggins
v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992).
22. Id. at 181, 808 P.2d at 538. Three justices joined the majority opinion. Justice Rose
concurred, but expressed reservations because the record failed to establish conclusively that
Riggins needed to be taking Mellaril, and that he would not function adequately if taken off
the drug. Id. at 184-85, 808 P.2d at 539 (Rose, J., concurring). Justice Springer was the sole
dissenter. Id. at 185-90, 808 P.2d at 540-43 (Springer, J., dissenting).
23. Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 49 (1991).
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judge failed to articulate adequately his assessment of the competing in-
terests of the State and the defendant.24 According to the majority, Rig-
gins had a significant due process interest in not being forced to take
antipsychotic drugs.2 This interest stems from the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's guarantee that a person will not be deprived of his liberty without
due process of law.26 The Court explained that "forcing antipsychotic
drugs on a convicted prisoner is impermissible absent a finding of over-
riding justification and a determination of medical appropriateness. 27
Justice O'Connor maintained that at a minimum, Riggins was enti-
tled to as much procedural due process as the convicted inmate forced to
take Mellaril in Washington v. Harper.28 In that case, the Court found
that the inmate's due process interests guaranteed him the right to refuse
medication unless the State showed that "the inmate [was] dangerous to
himself or others and the treatment is in the inmate's medical interest." 29
Harper involved the "unique circumstances of penal confinement," 30 Jus-
tice O'Connor noted, and "'pretrial detainees, [such as Riggins,] who
have not been convicted of any crimes, retain at least those constitutional
rights that we have held are enjoyed by convicted prisoners.' "31
For Riggins, those due process rights included a requirement that
the trial judge articulate the essential state policy that outweighed Rig-
gins's constitutional right not to have medication administered over his
objection.32 The Court did not require Riggins to show actual prejudice,
but rather concluded that there was a "strong possibility" his defense
24. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1817. In her opinion, Justice O'Connor significantly narrowed
the issues presented by the case, disposing of Riggins's claim that having the drug forcibly
administered denied him the opportunity to show jurors his true mental condition at the sen-
tencing. Id. at 1814. Justice O'Connor explained that failure to raise this issue before the
Nevada Supreme Court or in the petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court
meant the Court would not address that portion of the argument. Id. She also assumed that
Riggins's treatment was medically appropriate, and that he was given the drug against his will.
Id. In contrast, Justice Thomas in his dissent argued that Riggins began taking the drug vol-
untarily, and although the trial court denied Riggins permission to stop taking the drug during
trial, it never ordered him to take the medication. Id. at 1823 (Thomas, J., dissenting). While
Justice Scalia, the only other dissenter, joined Justice Thomas's dissent, he did not join this
portion of Justice Thomas's argument.
25. See id. at 1814.
26. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1814.
27. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1815. "In the case of antipsychotic drugs like Mellaril, that
interference is particularly severe." Id. at 1814.
28. 494 U.S. 210 (1990); see Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1815.
29. Harper, 494 U.S. at 227.
30. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1815.
31. Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979)).
32. Id. at 1816-17.
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was hurt by the administration of Mellaril.3 3 According to the Court,
medical testimony showed that the drugs may have affected Riggins's
outward appearance, the content of his testimony, and his ability to fol-
low the proceedings and to communicate with his lawyer.34 "[T]rial
prejudice can sometimes be justified by an essential state interest, '3 but
because the record failed to show what that interest was, the Court re-
versed and remanded for an assessment of the competing interests.36
In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy sought to provide some gui-
dance to the lower court when balancing the competing interests and
emphasized the State's heavy burden. 37 He compared the administration
of medication to tampering with evidence.38 Although the State has a
legitimate interest in bringing defendants to trial, he wrote, that interest
is outweighed by the defendant's due process rights.
In my view elementary protections against state intrusion re-
quire the State in every case to make a showing that there is no
significant risk that the medication will impair or alter in any
material way the defendant's capacity or willingness to react to
the testimony at trial or to assist his counsel. Based on my
understanding of the medical literature, I have substantial res-
ervations that the State can make that showing.3 9
Justice Kennedy saw the dangers of forced medication as twofold:
That the drugs would affect the defendant's demeanor in court, thereby
prejudicing his defense, and that they would make him unable or unwill-
ing to assist his lawyer in his defense." In Justice Kennedy's view, when
a defendant cannot become competent without compulsory medication,
the State should try to commit him.4 1
Justice Thomas, in dissent, argued that the mere possibility of preju-
dice was not enough to overturn the verdict.42 Instead, Riggins needed
to allege specific facts showing how he could not participate effectively in
his defense.43 Justice Thomas believed that expert testimony and Rig-
gins's own testimony about the effects of Mellaril mitigated the effect of
33. Id. at 1816.
34. Id. The Court also found that the possibility of prejudice was not sufficiently lessened
by expert testimony that explained the effect of Mellaril. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1817.
37. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
38. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
39. Id. at 1818 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
40. Id. at 1818-19 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 1820 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 1822 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 1823 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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any prejudicial changes in his demeanor during his trial.' While Riggins
might have a civil remedy for being medicated against his will, Justice
Thomas stated, he had no constitutional due process claim because he
failed to meet his burden of showing that his defense had been prejudiced
as a result of the forced medication.4"
Some knowledge of antipsychotic drugs and their side effects is es-
sential to an understanding of the issues raised by cases such as Riggins.
Antipsychotic drugs like Mellaril work by altering the chemical balance
in the patient's brain.46 Although mental processes are improved by the
drugs, they also produce side effects, which can include acute dystonia,
severe involuntary spasms of the upper body; akathesia, an inability to sit
still; neuroleptic malignant syndrome, which can lead to cardiac arrest
and death; and tardive dyskinesia, a neurological disorder characterized
by facial twitches that can be irreversible.47 Other common side effects
are drowsiness and a "stoned" feeling. A particularly strong version of
this side effect, called akinesia, can leave the patient feeling "dead in-
side"-as if nothing matters.48 According to the American Psychiatric
Association, "[b]y administering [Mellaril], the State may be creating a
prejudicial negative demeanor in the defendant-making him look ner-
vous and restless, for example, or so calm or sedated as to appear bored,
cold, unfeeling, and unresponsive."'49
The effects of antipsychotic drugs on criminal defendants have been
considered by a number of courts. For example, courts sometimes have
focused on whether the defendant's cognitive abilities will be impaired by
the administration of a drug. In Bee v. Greaves,5 ° the Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit found that antipsychotic drugs infringed upon First
44. Id. at 1822 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 1822-23 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
46. Antipsychotics are thought to restore the chemical balance of neurotransmitters
found in the brain. In schizophrenics, a chemical imbalance is believed to overstimulate the
brain in an unfocused way, causing hallucinations and delusions. Antipsychotics alter the
neurotransmitters to reduce the symptoms. See Shari L. Kahn, Comment, The Right to Ade-
quate Treatment Versus the Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drug Treatment: A Solution to the
Dilemma of the Involuntarily Committed Psychiatric Patient, 33 EMORY L.J. 441, 445 (1984).
47. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1814-15. The American Psychiatric Association, however,
warns against placing too much emphasis on the side effects. "Most of these side effects...
may be controlled by lowering dosages or by adding another medication; such side effects
ordinarily cease when antipsychotics are discontinued." Brief Amicus Curiae of the American
Psychiatric Association Supporting Petitioner at 10, Riggins (No. 90-8466).
48. See Linda C. Fentiman, Whose Right Is It Anyway?: Rethinking Competency to Stand
Trial in Light of the Synthetically Sane Insanity Defendant, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1109, 1129
(1986).
49. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Psychiatric Association Supporting Petitioner
at 13, Riggins (No. 90-8466).
50. 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984).
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Amendment rights because the drugs "have the capacity to severely and
even permanently affect an individual's ability to think and communi-
cate.""1 The American Psychiatric Association, however, has character-
ized the drugs as highly effective for eliminating the hallucinations and
delusions produced by psychosis.52 "There is simply no clinical basis for
a concern that antipsychotics impinge on protected interests in speech or
thought: to the contrary, antipsychotic medication ... enhanc[es] the
patient's ability to concentrate, to read, to learn and to communicate."5"
States are divided as to whether defendants may be forced to take
medication to make them competent for trial. Courts forbidding or re-
stricting the practice have raised concerns about how the defendant's
medically altered demeanor in court would affect a jury's decision re-
garding his sanity.54 They have also worried that the drugs may actually
affect how the individual thinks and his ability to assist his counsel.
Some courts have rejected suggestions that testimony from experts about
51. Id. at 1394. The dissenting justice for the Nevada Supreme Court in Riggins v. State
labeled the drugs a form of "chemical lobotomy." Riggins v. State, 107 Nev. 178, 185, 808
P.2d 535, 540 (1991) (Springer, J., dissenting). The roiling dissent denounced the practice of
forced administration of drugs in the strongest of terms: "I am hoping that this kind of drug
abuse, this kind of intrusion into the inner sancta of human personalities will be seen for what
it is, oppressive and violative of the human dignity of those who are forced to submit to the
demands of the white-coated syringe bearers." Id. at 187, 808 P.2d at 541 (Springer, J.,
dissenting).
52. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Psychiatric Association Supporting Petitioner
at 8, Riggins (No. 90-8466).
53. Id. For a survey of the scientific literature on the effects of psychotropic drugs, see
Thomas G. Gutheil & Paul S. Appelbaum, "Mind Control," "Synthetic Sanity," "Artiflcial
Competence," and Genuine Confusion: Legally Relevant Effects of Antipsychotic Medication,
12 HoFsTRA L. REv. 77 (1983). Despite the application of the pejorative label of "synthetic
sanity" to the resulting effect of psychotropic drugs, the American Psychiatric Association
asserts that "[t]he mental health produced by antipsychotic medication is no different from, no
more inauthentis or alien to the patient than the physical health produced by other medica-
tions, such as penicillin for pneumonia (which might be labeled 'synthetic fitness' or 'synthetic
health.')" Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Psychiatric Association Supporting Petitioner
at 9, Riggins (No. 90-8466).
54. See Commonwealth v. Louraine, 390 Mass. 28, 35, 453 N.E.2d 437, 443 (1983) (hold-
ing that the state may not compel a defendant to take medication that affects his demeanor at
trial); State v. Maryott, 492 P.2d 239, 242 (Wash. App. 1971); In re Pray, 133 Vt. 253, 257,
336 A.2d 174, 177 (1975) (stating that for the jurors, defendant's "deportment, demeanor, and
day-to-day behavior during that trial, before their eyes, was a part of the basis of their judg-
ment with respect to the kind of person he really was, and the justifiability of his defense of
insanity"). The Maryott court found:
If the state may administer tranquilizers to a defendant who objects, the state
then is, in effect, permitted to determine what the jury will see or not see of the
defendant's case by medically altering the attitude appearance and demeanor of the
defendant, when they are relevant to the jury's consideration of his mental condition.
Maryott, 492 P.2d at 242.
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how the medication affects the defendant offsets the potential prejudice."
Other state courts have reached contrary conclusions, emphasizing that
antipsychotic medications enhance a defendant's ability to assist his
counsel in his defense.56 These courts also emphasize that the State has a
strong interest in bringing defendants to trial.
The Riggins Court based much of its analysis on the 1990 Supreme
Court decision in Washington v. Harper.7 In that case, an inmate, after
initially consenting to take antipsychotics, changed his mind and refused
their administration.58 The Harper Court had to determine the circum-
stances under which a convicted inmate could be forced to take
medication.
The inmate claimed that the denial of a judicial hearing before the
drugs were administered violated his due process rights.5 9 The Washing-
ton Supreme Court reversed a lower court decision to medicate the in-
mate forcibly' and held that a full judicial hearing was required. At the
hearing, the court said, the State would have to prove by "clear, cogent
and convincing" evidence that the administration of the drug advanced a
compelling state interest.61
In a majority opinion written by Justice Kennedy,62 the United
55. See, e.g., Louraine, 390 Mass. at 35, 453 N.E.2d at 442 ("The ability to present expert
testimony describing the effect of medication on the defendant is not an adequate substitute"
for the defendant's right to testify in an unmedicated state.).
56. See State v. Law, 270 S.C. 664, 676, 244 S.E.2d 302, 306 (1978) ("While it is true the
medications do affect cognitive and communicative processes, the effect is beneficial in that it
enabled the appellant to effectively exercise the very rights he asserts he was denied.").
57. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
58. Id. at 213-14.
59. Id. at 217. The process that was followed required a three-member committee, com-
posed of a psychiatrist, a psychologist, and the associate superintendent of the prison, to re-
view the initial decision to medicate the inmate, which was made by a prison psychiatrist. Id.
at 215. The final decision to medicate required a majority vote including the psychiatrist, who
could not be involved in the inmate's treatment. Id at 215-16. The inmate was entitled to
seek judicial review of the initial determination in state court and periodic review of the rea-
sons for the involuntary medication. Id at 216.
60. Id. at 218.
61. Id.
62. Although he wrote the majority opinion in Harper, Justice Kennedy was the only
Justice in Riggins to decide that Harper and Riggins were not analogous.
This is not a case like Washington v. Harper ... in which the purpose of the involun-
tary medication was to insure that the incarcerated person ceased to be a physical
danger to himself or others. The inquiry in that context is both objective and man-
ageable. Here the purpose of the medication is not merely to treat a person with
grave psychiatric disorders and enable that person to function and behave in a way
not dangerous to himself or others, but rather to render the person competent to
stand trial.
Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1818 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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States Supreme Court reversed, even though it found that the inmate had
"a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of
antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause."6 Justice Kennedy
noted that the State had a legitimate interest in prison safety and secur-
ity. In light of this interest, the Court held the Washington Supreme
Court had erred in imposing a "clear and convincing" requirement on
the State for determining the validity of a prison regulation allowing the
forcible medication of the inmate.r4 Instead, the test was whether the
regulation was "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests."6
The reasonableness standard "was based upon the need to reconcile [the
Court's] longstanding adherence to the principle that inmates retain at
least some constitutional rights despite incarceration with the recognition
that prison authorities are best equipped to make difficult decisions re-
garding prison administration." '66
Although the Court found a reasonableness test sufficient to support
forced medication of an inmate in Harper, in Addington v. Texas67 the
Court adopted a "clear and convincing evidence test" for civil commit-
ment of individuals who have not been incarcerated. Addington's
mother sought his commitment to a state mental hospital. In determin-
ing whether Addington was mentally ill and dangerous to himself or
others-and therefore should be committed-the lower court merely re-
quired proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Addington argued
that the "reasonable doubt" standard should apply.68
The United States Supreme Court split the difference between the
two standards. It considered the State's legitimate interests both in pro-
viding for its citizens who are unable to take care of themselves and in
protecting the community.69 But it found that the harm from any poten-
tial error was greater for the individual, and so a higher "clear and con-
vincing" standard was required.7" The Court reasoned that "[i]ncreasing
the burden of proof is one way to impress the factfinder with the impor-
tance of the decisions and thereby perhaps to reduce the chances that
inappropriate commitments will be ordered."'"
Supreme Court decisions regarding a state's ability to infringe on a
63. Harper, 494 U.S. at 221.
64. Id. at 223.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 223-24.
67. 441 U.S. 418, 425-33 (1979).
68. Id. at 427.
69. Id. at 426.
70. Id. at 427, 431.
71. Id. at 427.
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defendant's personal autonomy in order to bring him to trial also are
helpful in analyzing the Riggins opinion. In Illinois v. Allen,72 for exam-
ple, the Court held that a defendant who repeatedly disrupted a trial
could be removed from the courtroom, threatened with contempt, or
bound and gagged to keep him from interrupting the trial. 73 The Court
reached that conclusion despite the Constitution's guarantee in the Con-
frontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment that "[iun all criminal prose-
cutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to be confronted with the
witnesses against him."' According to the Allen Court, even though
courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against the
loss of constitutional rights.., we explicitly hold today that a
defendant can lose his right to be present at trial if... he never-
theless insists on conducting himself in a manner so disorderly,
disruptive and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be
carried on with him in the courtroom.
75
In his concurrence, Justice Brennan cited the strong state interest in
bringing a defendant to justice as support for the Court's decision: "Con-
stitutional power to bring an accused to trial is fundamental to a scheme
of 'ordered liberty' and prerequisite to social justice and peace. 
'76
In Estelle v. Williams,77 the Court again discussed the conditions
under which a defendant can be tried despite suffering some prejudice at
his trial. The Estelle Court held that the Due Process Clause prohibits
states from trying prisoners in prison garb over their objection.78 Unlike
Allen, there was no essential state policy furthered by requiring defend-
ants to wear prison clothing.79 The majority acknowledged that it was
difficult to assess what harm, if any, might be experienced by prisoners in
such a situation, but found that "the probability of deleterious effects on
fundamental rights calls for close judicial scrutiny.... Courts must do
the best they can to evaluate the likely effect of a particular procedure,
72. 397 U.S. 337, 343-46 (1970).
73. Id. at 343-44. The Court noted that gagging the defendant was the least attractive of
the options: "[O]ne of the defendant's primary advantages of being present at the trial, his
ability to communicate with his counsel, is greatly reduced when the defendant is in a condi-
tion of total physical restraint." Id. at 344. Riggins's counsel made the argument that the
drugs administered to him were the mental equivalent of the restraints discussed in Allen.
Brief for Petitioner at 13, Riggins (No. 90-8466).
74. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
75. Allen, 397 U.S. at 343.
76. Id. at 347 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor quoted this passage in Riggins
to show one way the State might have justified administering the drug. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at
1815.
77. 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
78. Id at 512.
79. Id. at 505.
1993] 1215
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based on reason, principle, and common human experience.""
The Riggins Court failed to reach many of the intriguing questions
raised by Riggins's situation, but the Court's reasoning does provide
some indication of where it may be heading and how it may decide simi-
lar cases in the future. Indeed, the Court's recognition of the tension
between the defendant's interest in personal autonomy and the state's
interest in bringing wrongdoers to justice raises two separate issues. The
first question is under what circumstances a pretrial detainee can be
forced to take drugs against his will. The second is what level of preju-
dice, resulting from the defendant's forced medication, will be tolerated
during trial under the Due Process Clause.
With regard to the first question, individuals have a liberty interest
in avoiding forced administration of medications. In Washington v.
Harper, the Court explained that "[a] forcible injection of medication
into a nonconsenting person's body represents a substantial interference
with that person's liberty."81 The majority in Riggins noted that "[iln
the case of antipsychotic drugs like Mellaril, that interference is particu-
larly severe."82 Despite this substantial interference, the Harper Court
held that an inmate could be forced to take antipsychotic drugs against
his will so long as the State could show that it was reasonably related to
the State's interests.
The Riggins Court explained that, at a minimum, Riggins should
receive the protection of the Harper standard. 83 Further, the Court left
itself room to set a higher standard in the future: "Nevada certainly
would have satisfied due process if the prosecution had demonstrated and
the District Court had found that treatment with antipsychotic medica-
tion was medically appropriate and, considering less intrusive alterna-




In addition to showing that the drugs were medically appropriate
and essential to the safety of Riggins or others, the Court suggested a
second way that the State could have met its burden: "Similarly, the
State might have been able to justify medically appropriate,8" involuntary
80. Id. at 504.
81. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990).
82. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1814.
83. Id. at 1815 ("The Fourteenth Amendment affords at least as much protection to per-
sons the State detains for trial.").
84. Id. (emphasis added). Harper did not require a finding that the administration of the
medication was essential to the inmate's safety.
85. Both of the standards suggested in Riggins include the requirement that the drugs that
are sought to be given must be in the defendant's medical interest. That means that a physi-
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treatment with the drug by establishing that it could not obtain an adju-
dication of Riggins' guilt or innocence by using less intrusive means.""6
The issue that this alternative raises is how much weight the State's inter-
est in adjudication should be given. The Court's tone-particularly the
use of the word "similarly" in referring to the alternative way that the
State "certainly" could have administered the drugs against Riggins's
will by showing medical appropriateness and that the drug was essential
to protect the safety of Riggins or others-may hint that the majority
considers the State's interest a trump card, always superior to the defend-
ant's.8 7 The Riggins Court never reached this issue.
Although the Riggins Court did not articulate the standard the State
would have to meet to justify involuntary administration of drugs, its
language prompted Justice Thomas to claim that the Court "appears to
adopt a standard of strict scrutiny."88 To buttress that claim, he de-
scribed the majority as criticizing the trial court "for failing to find either
that the 'continued administration of Mellaril was required to ensure the
defendant could be tried,' or that 'other compelling concerns outweighed
Riggins' interest in freedom from unwanted antipsychotic drugs.' "89
The majority disputed that interpretation, explaining:
Contrary to the dissent's understanding, we do not "adopt a
standard of strict scrutiny." ... We have no occasion to finally
prescribe such substantive standards as mentioned above, since
the District Court allowed administration of Mellaril to con-
tinue without making any determination of the need for this
cian must decide that the medication is appropriate for the defendant's treatment. See Wash-
ington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 222 n.8 (1990) (upholding regulation that says "anti-psychotic
medication can be administered only for treatment purposes"). This is not a difficult standard
to meet, because it merely requires that physicians cannot "prescribe these drugs for reasons
unrelated to the medical needs of the patients." Id. It does, however, prevent the State from
administering medication for the sole purpose of making a defendant competent to stand trial.
86. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1815.
87. Here are the two statements in context:
Although we have not had occasion to develop substantive standards for judging
forced administration of such drugs in the trial or pretrial settings, Nevada certainly
would have satisfied due process if the prosecution had demonstrated and the Dis-
trict Court had found that treatment with antipsychotic medication was medically
appropriate and, considering less intrusive alternatives, essential for the sake of Rig-
gins' own safety or the safety of others. Similarly, the State might have been able to
justify medically appropriate, involuntary treatment with the drug by establishing
that it could not obtain an adjudication of Riggins' guilt or innocence by using less
intrusive means. We note that during the July 14 hearing Riggins did not contend
that he had the right to be tried without Mellaril if its discontinuation rendered him
incompetent.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
88. Id. at 1826 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
89. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added by Justice Thomas) (citations omitted).
1993] 1217
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
course or any findings about reasonable alternatives.9'
As previously noted, Riggins raised a second question: After the
defendant is medicated to make him competent to stand trial, how much
prejudice to the defendant's constitutional rights will be tolerated during
that trial? The majority took two strides toward protecting the rights of
defendants in Riggins's situation. First, it rejected the theory that expert
testimony as to the effects of medication is adequate to overcome any
prejudice.91 Justice O'Connor contended that expert testimony about the
effect of the drugs on Riggins was inadequate to safeguard Riggins's due
process rights: "[A]llowing Riggins to present expert testimony about
the effect of Mellaril on his demeanor did nothing to cure the possibility
that the substance of his own testimony, his interaction with counsel, or
his comprehension at trial were compromised by forced administration
of Mellaril." 92 The theory that such expert testimony is adequate to
overcome any prejudicial effects of the drugs has several adherents
among the states, and also was important to the dissent's reasoning.
93
The Riggins majority also held that the defendant need not show
actual prejudice to have his verdict overturned. 9a Citing Estelle" and
Allen,96 the Court acknowledged that the prejudice to the defendant may
be difficult to demonstrate with concrete examples. "[T]he precise conse-
quences of forcing antipsychotic medication upon Riggins cannot be
shown from a trial transcript. What the testimony of doctors who ex-
amined Riggins establishes, and what we will not ignore, is a strong pos-
sibility that Riggins' defense was impaired due to the administration of
Mellaril. ' '97
90. Id at 1815-16.
91. Id. at 1816. Some courts rely upon this justification to uphold verdicts against invol-
untarily medicated defendants. See, e.g., State v. Law, 270 S.C. 664, 673, 244 S.E.2d 302, 306-
07 (1978) (finding that insanity defense was not undermined where "both the fact of medica-
tion and its effect upon the appellant were fully imparted to the jury by the testimony of the
medical witnesses").
92. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1816.
93. Id. at 1822 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas cited three cases in support of
his view that expert testimony can overcome possible prejudice to the defendant: State v.
Jojola, 89 N.M. 489, 493, 553 P.2d 1296, 1300 (1976); Law, 270 S.C. at 673, 244 S.E.2d at 306;
and In re Pray, 133 Vt. 253, 257-58, 336 A.2d 174, 177 (1975). In In re Pray the court asserted
that expert testimony was required "at the very least" to explain the effect of the drugs on the
defendant, Gary Pray. The court went on to say, in contrast to Justice Thomas's views, "it
may well have been necessary, in view of the critical nature of the issue, to expose the jury to
the undrugged, unsedated Gary Pray, at least, insofar as safety and trial progress might per-
mit." Id. at 258, 336 A.2d at 177.
94. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1816.
95. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976); see supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
96. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970); see supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
97. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1816.
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Justice O'Connor's assessment of the difficulty of establishing the
prejudicial effect of Riggin's taking Mellaril is evidenced by Riggins's
trial record. The trial transcript apparently showed little that related to
Riggins's demeanor during trial. That prompted Riggins's attorneys to
include statements in their brief that amounted to testimony by defense
counsel, such as "[Re was so heavily drugged by the State of Nevada
that he appeared like a zombie during his trial.""8 The State responded:
"In light of the facts on the record, references in Petitioner's brief to his
'zombie-like appearance' at trial are pernicious and irresponsible. All
references in Petitioner's brief to the 'apathetic,' 'flat,' and 'emotionless'
state of Petitioner are simply not supported in the record." 99 The diffi-
culty of reviewing the record in these types of cases seems to necessitate
either a system of review heavily weighted toward the trial judge's discre-
tion, or a system in which the state is rarely, if ever, allowed to bring
such medicated defendants to trial. If review is too difficult to undertake
at the appellate level, the decisions must either be left to the trial judge or
foregone completely by not trying the defendants.
While the majority did not detail the constitutional protections po-
tentially affected by Riggins's forced medication, Justice Kennedy ex-
amined this issue fully in his concurrence. °° He stated that interference
with the defendant's testimony implicates the Fifth Amendment's due
process protections 0 1 and the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth
Amendment. 102 Such interference with the defendant's testimony, ac-
cording to Justice Kennedy, violates the principle announced in Rock v.
Arkansas 103 that the Fifth Amendment permits the accused to testify "in
the unfettered exercise of his own will.""l
98. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Riggins (No. 90-8466).
99. Brief for Respondent at 18, Riggins (No. 90-8466).
100. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1817-20 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
101. Iad at 1819 (Kennedy, I., concurring).
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "No person shall be
... deprived or life, liberty or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
102. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1819 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The Sixth Amendment pro-
vides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to have the Assist-
ance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
103. 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
104. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1820 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Rock, 483 U.S. at 53).
The majority in Riggins also expressed concern that the medication may have altered the con-
tent of Riggins's testimony, noting that in extreme cases, the soporific effects of antipsychotics
can affect thought processes. Id at 1816. In fact, there was some evidence that the Mellaril
did affect the content of Riggins's testimony. Riggins planned to read a statement expressing
his grief and remorse for the crime, but found himself unable to read the statement-as a result
of the Mellaril, his attorney asserted. Brief for Petitioner at 21, Riggins (No. 90-8466). In-
stead, his attorney was forced to read the statement into the record, blunting its impact. Id.
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Justice Kennedy's primary concern, however, was with the possible
changes in demeanor Mellaril might cause.' 05 Sedating the defendant
and allowing him to be seen by the jury as cold and uncaring raises ques-
tions under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Riggins's right to confront
his accusers, his right not to be forced to be a witness against himself,
and his right to a fair trial all may have been undermined. Ultimately, as
the Riggins majority indicated, the analysis in such cases will consist of
balancing the possible trial prejudice and the interest in personal auton-
omy against an essential state interest. 6 But the Court has left unde-
cided for the time being what showing will be required and what
standard of review it will use to ensure that defendants' rights are not
trampled.
Where should the Court go from here? In balancing the competing
interests, the Court should be aware that the possibility of trial prejudice
may be particularly strong in certain cases involving schizophrenic de-
fendants who must be forcibly medicated with antipsychotic drugs to be
competent to stand trial. Cases involving either the insanity defense or
the death penalty are particularly susceptible to prejudice because of
changes in the defendant's demeanor107
When a defendant pleads the insanity defense, the prejudice associ-
ated with medicated testimony arises because the defendant's demeanor
is altered, and the jury may get a skewed view of what the defendant is
like. Jurors typically are instructed to regard the demeanor of the wit-
nesses as part of their consideration of how much weight to give the testi-
mony. In fact, an instruction to consider "demeanor and manner while
on the stand" was given in Riggins.0 8 Demeanor is a particularly impor-
tant factor in insanity trials as jurors attempt to look beyond the often
conflicting psychiatric testimony.
[I]t is an established and universally accepted rule that, when
the defendant's sanity is at issue, the trier of fact is entitled to
consider the defendant's demeanor in court....
... Further, if the defendant appears calm and controlled
at trial, the jury may well discount any testimony that the de-
fendant lacked, at the time of the crime, substantial capacity
either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to con-
form his conduct to the requirements of the law. '09
105. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1819 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
106. Id. at 1816 ("To be sure, trial prejudice can sometimes be justified by an essential state
interest.").
107. Fentiman, supra note 48, at 1138-39.
108. Record on Appeal at 226, Riggins (No. 90-8466).
109. Commonwealth v. Louraine, 390 Mass. 28, 34-35, 453 N.E.2d 437, 442 (1983). In
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In a death penalty case, the risk of prejudice is high because of the
emphasis jurors place on demeanor during the sentencing phase. This
view is borne out by a study of Florida cases in which the authors inter-
viewed jurors about the reasons for their decisions in cases in which de-
fendants were sentenced to death.11° Thirty-two percent of the jurors
interviewed listed the demeanor of the defendant among their reasons for
imposing the death penalty.11 Their comments about those they sen-
tenced to death included: "'indifferent to the proceedings,' 'without re-
gret or guilt,' 'passive,' 'unremorseful,' 'emotionless,' 'no remorse-no
anything.' "112
Those descriptive comments easily could apply to defendants who
have taken antipsychotic drugs and are suffering their side effects. Aki-
nesia, one of the known side effects of antipsychotic drugs, leaves the
patient lifeless and apathetic, making him seem unconcerned about what
goes on around him.11 Akinesia can even change the defendant's facial
expressions "so that he appears in mild cases to lack spontaneity of ex-
pression, and in severe cases to have a wooden, 'mask-like' face." '114 Due
to these potential side effects, in cases involving insanity pleas or death
penalty sentencing, the state should not put a defendant on trial if his
demeanor is negatively and significantly affected by the state-adminis-
tered drugs.
The same conclusion may be reached by use of either of the two
formulas articulated by the Court for assessing procedural due process
concerns. In considering cases in which rights protected by the Due Pro-
cess Clause are infringed by government action, the Court has used a
three-part test first articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge.11 That test re-
quires courts to weigh (1) the private interest affected, (2) the risk to the
constitutionally protected interest from an incorrect decision along with
the value of any additional procedures, and (3) the government's
interest.
116
fact, the defense accused the prosecutor in Riggins of trying to use Riggins's demeanor against
him in violation of a pretrial order. The prosecutor argued at trial: "And does Riggins express
sorrow, no. Does he express remorse, no. Is Riggins crazy, no." Brief of Petitioner at 17,
Riggins (No. 90-8466).
110. William S. Geimer & Jonathan Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or Death: Operative
Factors in 10 Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 24 (1987-88).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. "The patient's disinclination to speak, while perhaps beneficial from a psychiatric
point of view, is a definite liability to an effective criminal defense." Tomashefsky, supra note
13, at 785.
114. Fentiman, supra note 48, at 1129.
115. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
116. The Mathews Court stated that courts are to consider:
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The Court also has applied a test first used in Patterson v. New
York. 11 7 Under that test, the state has the power to regulate criminal
procedure, "and its decision in this regard is not subject to proscription
under the Due Process Clause unless 'it offends some principle of justice
so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental.' "118
In applying those tests to Riggins, a very strong, constitutionally
protected interest of freedom from unwanted bodily intrusions can be
identified.119 The Supreme Court has included "[a]mong the historic lib-
erties ... [the] right to be free from and to obtain judicial relief, for
unjustified intrusions on personal security."1 20 Riggins also has a vital
and fundamental interest in receiving a fair trial-an interest protected
by the Due Process Clause.
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the prob-
able value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administra-
tive burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id at 335.
117. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
118. Id. at 202. The Court has used both tests in criminal procedure cases, and which test
it would select in a Riggins-like situation is an open question. In Medina v. California, 112 S.
Ct. 2572 (1992), handed down a little more than a month after Riggins, the Court for the first
time stated that the Mathews test was inappropriate for many criminal procedure cases. Jus-
tice Kennedy, writing for the majority, stated that the Mathews balancing test "does not pro-
vide the appropriate framework for assessing the validity of state procedural rules which, like
the one at bar, are part of the criminal process." Id. at 2576. Although the Court has used the
Mathews test to assess criminal procedure in the past, in Medina it noted, "It is not at all clear
that Mathews was essential to the results reached in those cases." Id. at 2577. Other Justices,
however, remain committed to Mathews. Justices O'Connor and Souter, who concurred in the
Medina decision, suggested that "[t]he balancing of equities that Mathews v. Eldridge outlines
remains a useful guide in due process cases." Id. at 2582 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The
dissent in Medina, written by Justice Blackmun and joined by Justice Stevens, stated, "[I]t is
clear that the Court ends up engaging in a balancing inquiry not meaningfully distinguishable
from that of the Mathews v. Eldridge test it earlier appears to forswear." Id. at 2586 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting). Whether the Court would view the issues in Riggins as significantly dif-
ferent from Medina, requiring the higher protections of the Mathews test, is uncertain. But
Justice Kennedy, who wrote the majority opinion in Medina, appeared to consider the Riggins
issues in a different category, stating:
In my view elementary protections against state intrusion require the State in every
case to make a showing that there is no significant risk that the medication will
impair or alter in any material way the defendant's capacity or willingness to react to
the testimony at trial or to assist his counsel.
Riggins, 112 S. Ct. 1818 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
119. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990) (stating that an individ-
ual has a significant liberty interest in avoiding forced administration of antipsychotic drugs);
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-74 (1952) (holding that evidence gained from pumping
the stomach of a defendant is not admissible).
120. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977).
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On the other hand, the government has a responsibility to protect its
citizens from dangerous criminals. An assumption underlying the Con-
stitution's individual protections is that the government nevertheless has
the ability to bring a defendant to trial. 21 The governmental interest in
medicating a defendant in order to try him is diminished, however, by
the option of civil commitment. A defendant accused of murder and
suffering from serious mental illness requiring antipsychotic drugs will
certainly qualify for civil commitment. Thus, society can be protected, at
least initially, regardless of whether the defendant is forcibly
medicated. 122
The private interest and the government interest seem roughly to
balance each other out, or perhaps even tilt slightly in the defendant's
favor. When the risk of wrongly depriving Riggins of his due process
rights and of depriving him of a fair trial are considered, however, it is
clear that the potential for harm is enormous. For Riggins, there was a
very real possibility that he received an unfair trial as a result of the side
effects of the medication. If the jury thought that Riggins seemed sane at
trial, it may have concluded that he likely was sane at the time he com-
mitted the killing. If it decided that his demeanor was aloof and uncar-
ing, it may have decided that he was an unfit candidate for mercy.
Instead of finding Riggins not guilty by reason of insanity, followed by
his commitment and treatment, Riggins was sentenced to death. For
these reasons, the balance seems to fall clearly in Riggins's favor.
Under the Patterson test, the Due Process Clause does not restrict
the state's decisions regarding criminal procedure unless there is a firm
and consistent historical basis for a different procedure, or the state's rule
121. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 347 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
122. Ultimately, a decision restricting the states' ability to force incompetent defendants to
take medication for trial may push more states toward the "guilty but mentally ill" standard.
That standard allows states to continue to hold defendants even after they recover from the
mental illness that originally led to the crime; in cases involving defendants who abused drugs,
such a standard has significant implications. Psychiatrists attributed some of Riggins's mental
problems to his drug use. Brief for Respondent at 10, Riggins (No. 90-8466). Dr. O'Gorman
diagnosed Riggins's schizophrenic condition as secondary to his drug abuse, and he testified
that Riggins's mental condition was common among drug abusers. Id. In Foucha v. Louisi-
ana, 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992), the Court considered whether a defendant who committed a crime
in a drug-induced psychosis and who later was found not guilty by reason of insanity could
continue to be held in a mental hospital simply because he remained dangerous. Id. at 1785-
89. After the defendant was off drugs, the psychosis and other mental disease disappeared. Id.
The Court held that he could not continue to be imprisoned. Id. Decisions such as this mean
that defendants who commit crimes in a drug-induced psychosis and are acquitted by reason of
insanity can be released if they stay off drugs and, consequently, the psychosis ends. The
public outcry when these cases are publicized seems to pressure the courts toward adopting the
"guilty but mentally ill" standard, allowing the state to continue to hold those who have com-
mitted crimes.
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"transgresses any recognized principle of fundamental fairness." '123
While there is no firmly entrenched historical practice among the states,
the drugging of a defendant, if it interferes with his ability to defend
himself, would violate the principle of fundamental fairness. The Fourth
Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons ' 124 and so would appear to afford protection in the medicating-
to-competence situation.
It remains to be decided to what additional process Riggins may be
entitled. Because the interests and rights at stake are so fundamental,
and the risk of erroneous deprivation so great, defendants in Riggins's
situation should be entitled to a full adversarial hearing before trial.
That hearing would be used to adduce whether, and to what to degree,
the medications administered by the State have interfered with the de-
fendant's ability to assist his counsel or have altered his demeanor in a
prejudicial fashion.' 25
The question then arises as to the standard of proof the government
must meet to justify intrusion on a defendant's liberty interest. In allo-
cating the burden of proof, the Court should require the State to show by
"clear and convincing evidence" that the defendant will not be signifi-
cantly prejudiced in his defense by the administration of the drugs.'26
The standard of proof plays a fundamental role in whether due process
has been given in a particular case.
The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embod-
ied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is
to "instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence
our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual
conclusions for a particular type of adjudication." 127
The Court has already held in Addington v. Texas 128 that state commit-
ment proceedings must be administered under a "clear and convincing"
123. Medina v. California, 112 S. Ct. 2572, 2578 (1992).
124. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
125. See Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1818-19 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that the effect on
demeanor and on willingness to assist counsel are the two ways a defendant is likely to be
prejudiced by the drugs).
126. This standard seems to be supported by the tone of Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337
(1970), in which the Court said it would "indulge every reasonable presumption against the
loss of constitutional rights." Id. at 343. There, the obstreperous but sane inmate lost his right
to be present at his trial because of his own actions. In Riggins, the defendant lost his right to
participate fully in his defense through the actions of the State and actions of his own over
which, arguably, he had no control.
127. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
128. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
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standard.12 9 The Court reasoned that a clear and convincing evidence
standard should apply because the burden of mistake falls hardest on the
individual: His freedom may be lost.13 In Riggins, too, the risk of mis-
take most seriously threatens the individual.
There is ample precedent for use of this standard. The Addington
Court noted that "this Court has used the 'clear, unequivocal and con-
vincing' standard of proof to protect particularly important individual
interests." 131  Under such a standard, the state would have to show
before trial, by clear and convincing evidence, that the medication did
not impair the defendant's cognitive functioning substantially, and that
he did not suffer from side effects that would unfavorably impress the
jury. A failure to make such a showing is a denial of due process because
it denies the defendant his right to a "full and fair trial." If the State is
unable to meet this standard, it must resort to its alternatives of trying
the defendant without medication or attempting to commit civilly the
defendant. 132
The clear and convincing evidence standard is particularly appropri-
ate where the proof depends on psychiatric testimony. In Addington, the
Court chose the clear and convincing standard for commitment proceed-
ings, noting that much of psychiatry is based on the subjective impres-
sions of the psychiatrist. 133 The Addington Court asserted that "[g]iven
the lack of certainty and the fallibility of psychiatric diagnosis, there is a
serious question as to whether a state could ever prove beyond a reason-
able doubt that an individual is ... mentally ill."'1 3
4
A prohibition on trying defendants who must be medicated to be-
come competent, as suggested by Justice Kennedy, 135 is undesirable be-
129. Id. at 427.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 424. (citing various types of civil cases: Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285
(1966) (adopting the standard in a deportation case); Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350,
353-54 (1960) (using the standard in a denaturalization case); Schneiderman v. United States,
320 U.S. 118, 125, 158 (1943) (using the standard in a denaturalization case)); see also
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982) (finding that the interest of a parent in custody
of her child is so strong that the state must show by "clear and convincing" evidence that
statutory criteria for termination of parental rights have been met). In Santosky the Court
said, "This Court has mandated an intermediate standard of proof-'clear and convincing
evidence'-when the individual interests at stake in a state proceeding are both 'particularly
important' and 'more substantial than mere loss of money.'" Id. at 756 (quoting Addington,
441 U.S. at 424).
132. Of course, if a defendant later became competent without the use of medication, he
could be tried for the crime.
133. Addington, 441 U.S. at 430.
134. Id. at 429.
135. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1817 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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cause it fails to recognize that the side effects can be mitigated by
lowering dosages or treating the defendant with other medications,"1
6
and that not every defendant experiences side effects that would impair
his ability to testify on his own behalf and to assist his counsel. While
the standard proposed by Justice Kennedy would protect the defendant's
"significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of
antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment," '37 it also would negate the State's considerable interest in
bringing the accused to trial. Alternatively, lowering the standard to a
preponderance of the evidence would fail to protect adequately the de-
fendant's constitutional rights and would not be consistent with the
Supreme Court's traditional strict scrutiny of State actions that poten-
tially interfere with the defendant's fundamental constitutional rights. 138
The "clear and convincing evidence" standard best accounts for the in-
terests of the defendant and of the State. It protects society's interest in
bringing wrongdoers to trial without sanctioning trials that would abro-
gate the defendant's constitutional rights.
WILLIAM B. BYSTRYNSKI
136. See supra note 47.
137. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990).
138. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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